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Abstract
We study how complementarities and intellectual property rights aﬀect the man-
agement of knowledge workers. The main results relay when a firm will wish to
sue workers that leave with innovative ideas, and the eﬀects of complementary as-
sets on wages and on worker initiative. We argue that firms strongly protected
by property rights may not sue leaving workers in order to motivate eﬀort, while
firms weakly protected by complementary assets must sue in order to obtain pos-
itive profits. Firms with more complementary assets pay higher wages (and have
lower turnover), but such higher pay has a detrimental eﬀect on worker initiative.
Our analysis suggests that strengthened property rights protection reduces turnover
costs but weakens worker initiative.
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To make knowledge-work productive will be the great management task of this
century, just as to make manual work productive was the great management
task of the last century (Peter Drucker, 1969, p.290).
1 Introduction
Knowledge workers make up a significant fraction of the workforce in advanced economies
(some estimates loom as high as 25-30%). Their expertise determines the success of count-
less organizations around the world, but still we have limited insight on the management
of such workers.1 The paper aims to fill this void in a context where worker initiative
stems from the possibility of leaving its employer carrying valuable ideas, and firms are
imperfectly protected by complementary assets and property rights. Our analysis ad-
dresses two questions. When will a firm take legal action and sue its leaving workers?
How do complementary assets and property rights influence a firm’s wage policy and
worker initiative?
The crux of the paper is twofold. We argue that a firm weakly protected by comple-
mentary assets should sue its leaving workers, while a firm strongly protected by property
rights may not. A firm weakly protected by complementary assets must sue in order to
avoid having only unproductive workers stay on in the firm. A strongly protected firm
may not sue because suing would eliminate worker initiative. Second, we argue that firms
with more complementary assets should pay higher wages, and will as a result experience
less worker initiative. The intuition is that a firm with more complementary assets has
a higher marginal value from workers staying on, and will therefore pay higher wages
in order to keep more workers. However, such higher pay will serve as a cushion that
weakens worker initiative.
In the model, firms are exposed to both moral hazard in that workers exert unob-
servable eﬀort to generate ideas, and adverse selection in that workers observe their ideas
privately. After a worker has generated an idea, the firm oﬀers a continuation wage which
the worker may accept and stay on in the firm, or reject and start up his own business. If
1See the January 2006 survey of the Economist, Roberts (2004), or Neef (1999) for evidence on the
importance of knowledge workers.
2
the worker leaves, the firm may sue the worker. Complementarities play a role in deter-
mining the value of the idea to the firm. Property rights play a role in determining how
likely it is that the firm wins a litigation case against the worker.
The worker’s motivation to exert eﬀort stems from being able to capture a fraction of
the value of the idea if leaving. The worker has stronger incentives to exert eﬀort if he
expects the firm not to sue, since this fraction then becomes larger. The firm’s litigation
policy therefore balances the benefits from more motivated workers with the costs from
more workers leaving. At a casual level, this trade-oﬀ accords with the personnel policy
at Hewlett Packard, which in addition to encouraging workers to start up their own
companies had a reputation for the employees being highly motivated.
We find that a firm strongly protected by strong property rights may not sue leaving
workers. The reason is that suing would be a ”too powerful” instrument under strong
property rights and may ruin worker initiative. We find that a firm not protected by
complementary assets must sue in order to get positive profits. The intuition is that if the
firm does not have complementary assets, not suing will lead to adverse selection where
only workers not worth the wage they are paid will stay on in the firm.
Our analysis suggests that firms more strongly protected by complementarities pay
higher wages, has less turnover and has less motivated workers. Stronger complementar-
ities imply that a given idea has a higher value inside the firm, and the firm decreases
turnover by paying more. Lower turnover implies less motivated workers, because the
entrepreneurial option becomes less attractive relative to staying on in the firm. If we
assume that larger firms have stronger complementarities, these findings are consistent
with evidence from labor economics that larger firms pay higher wages (see e.g., Fox, 2004,
for an overview) and have lower turnover (Even & MacPherson, 1996, Kim & Marschke,
2005).
Finally, our analysis suggests that weakened property rights protection increases worker
initiative but may waste synergies. We note that the existing literature (e.g., Schotchmer,
2004) argues that intellectual property rights should be strong when ex-ante eﬀects (on
firms’ R&D investments) are important relative to ex-post eﬀects (on the use of innova-
tions). In contrast, we suggest that intellectual property rights should be weak when the
ex-ante eﬀects (on worker initiative) are relatively important and strong when the ex-post
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eﬀects (on the use of complementary assets) are important.
The paper is structured as follows. The next subsection discusses related literature.
Section 2 contains the model setup, Section 3 the analysis, and Section 4 concludes. The
appendix contains proofs.
1.1 Related literature
The empirical motivation for the paper comes from several sources. Bhide (2000) finds
that 71% of entrepreneurs in his sample replicated or modified an idea encountered
through previous employment, which echoes earlier research by Cooper (1984).2 Marschke
& Kim (2005) finds that firms located in industries with higher worker turnover rates
patent more, which suggests that patenting may partly be a protective measure against
employees. This evidence suggests that knowledge workers pose a threat in addition to
being a crucial input.3 On the prevalence of workers leaving their employer, Stone (2002)
reports that the number of court cases involving covenants not to compete and trade se-
crets has increased sharply over the last decades. Similar findings are reported by Lowry
(1988). At a case level, Hewlett-Packard institutionalized a famous policy where workers
were encouraged to leave and start up their own companies, often with ideas based in their
employment at Hewlett-Packard.4 On the other hand, in a much-publicized case where
workers from the electronics company Cadence founded a company based on software
programs and customer relations developed at Cadence, Cadence sued the workers and
several of the previous employees received fines and prison sentences (Glynn &Mukherjee,
2003).5 This anecdotal evidence suggests, but obviously does not prove, a considerable
heterogeneity in the suing policy of R&D intensive firms.
We are not aware of closely related theoretical papers. There are three branches of
2Cooper (1985) finds that 70% of founders of new firms in a broad cross-section of industries where
previously employed in the same industry.
3There is a long range of anecdotal evidence that gives the same picture. A fascinating historical
account is given by Fisk (2001).
4The response of Dave Packard, one of the two founders of Hewlett-Packard, was, ”Are we upset that
they left us? On the contrary, Bill and I understand and respect their entrepreneurial spirit.” (Packard,
1995)
5Among more well-known companies, Intel and Microsoft have a reputation for being uncooperative
with leavers, and the same goes for a range of Route 128 companies as described by Saxenian (1994).
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the literature that address related issues: the management of innovation, the economics
of litigation, and the industrial economics of R&D.
Pakes & Nitzan (1983) considered a moral hazard problem where firms have no formal
property rights protection and workers can appropriate part of their output. Such appro-
priation provides workers with an incentive to provide eﬀort. While our model shares this
feature of Pakes-Nitzan, their paper does not consider workers having private informa-
tion about output, which drives turnover in our model, nor the possibility of firms suing
leaving workers.6
Anton & Yao (1994, 2002) asks how a privately informed inventor might sell an idea
when formal property rights are non-existing. Anton & Yao (1994) argues that the threat
of selling oﬀ the idea to a competitor may give the inventor some rents from bargaining
with an incumbent firm, and Anton & Yao (2002) argues that a partial disclosure of
the idea can be beneficial to the inventor.7 We use the insight from Anton-Yao that an
inventor may be reluctant to reveal the content of an idea to motivate our assumption
that workers have private information about their innovations, but we do not explore
mechanisms in which the worker can transmit his private information. This question is
briefly discussed in Section 3.5.
In the incomplete contract setting of Aghion & Tirole (1994), the problem is how to
allocate ownership to alleviate hold-up problems between a research unit and a customer.
Their assumption that ownership rights over an invention are contractible eliminates most
of the issues we are concerned about, in particular turnover.8
6The same holds for Kim & Marschke (2005). Hvide (2005) considers a Pakes-Nitzan type of model
where workers have private information about the value of their output. Hvide (2005) does not consider
workers’ eﬀort decision, nor firms’ suing decision.
Møen (2005) considers labor mobility in a sample of firms with varying R&D intensity. Møen finds,
consistent with the Pakes-Nitzan view that wage setting in R&D intensive firms is geared to retain workers,
that the steepness of wage profile is positively related to a firm’s R&D intensity. Oyer & Schaefer (2005)
finds evidence that option-based compensation is geared to retain workers rather than to elicit eﬀort.
7A related literature considers how to protect innovations from product-market competitors (e.g.,
Anton & Yao, 2004). The underlying tension is that patents may give stronger formal rights but also
disclose more about the innovation.
8Hellmann (2003) and Subramanian (2003) consider the multi-tasking problem that ensues if a worker
can engage in ”private activities” on the job with the intention of creating a start-up later. In contrast
to these papers, we assume that the main problem from the principal’s viewpoint is workers leaving with
ideas generated through their legitimate work.
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The incentives to litigate have been studied by several authors, e.g., Bebchuk (1984)
and Reinganum &Wilde (1986) on pretrial negotiations, and Priest & Klein (1984) on the
probability of succeeding in court. On empirical evidence, Siegelman & Waldfogel (1996)
and Lanjouw & Lerner (1998) estimates a Priest-Klein model on data from litigation
cases, and finds that intellectual property rights cases are relatively predictable but also
quite hard to win (about 35% are ruled in favor of the plaintiﬀ in the former sample).
According to Mansfield (1986) in many industries firms regard complementary assets,
rather than property rights, as their main tool for protecting their innovations. The
present paper is to our knowledge the first on how complementary assets aﬀect the man-
agement of knowledge workers. Most of the industrial economics literature on R&D has
considered the firm as a unit and examined how product market competition and patent
policy jointly determine R&D investments (Scotchmer, 2004, gives an overview). While
this literature provides insight into how a firm’s competitive environment stimulates in-
vestments in R&D, it has been unable to analyze how successful innovation depends on
worker initiative.
2 The model
There is one principal (owner) and one agent (worker). The agent has reservation utility
U¯ , which we normalize to zero. At date 1, the agent is hired and paid a fixed wage F ≥ 0.
The worker then exerts eﬀort e at a private cost c(e). At date 2, an idea with stand-alone
value x is realized, where x = e+ ² and ² is a random variable with distribution function
G(.). The agent learns x, whereas the firm does not. The firm then oﬀers a continuation
wage B ≥ 0 based on its conjecture about x. The agent accepts or rejects B. Accepting
B means signing an extension of the employment contract, in which case the final payoﬀs
become θx−B to the firm and B to the agent, where θ ≥ 1. If the agent rejects, he quits
the firm and develops a start-up based on x. The parameter θ reflects the gains from
developing the idea inside the firm due to complementary assets (such as equipment, sales
channels, or co-workers). A situation with weak complementarities corresponds to θ close
to 1 and a situation with strong complementarities corresponds to θ >> 1. Initially we
treat θ as given and briefly discuss investments in θ in Section 3.3.
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The worker’s payoﬀ from leaving with the idea depends on whether the firm sues the
worker at date 3 or not. At date 3, the idea has matured into something more ”physical”
(like technical drawings or a prototype) that - although its value is not verifiable - the
court can transfer from the worker to the firm. If the firm does not sue, the final payoﬀs
become 0 to the firm and x to the worker. If the firm sues, the payoﬀs depend on the
court outcome. If the court rules in favor of the firm, the firm gets θx− v, where v ≥ 0 is
the cost of litigation. The worker gets zero. If the court rules in favor of the worker, the
worker keeps the idea and develops it independently of the firm. The firm then gets −v
and the worker gets x.9
As evidenced by a large legal literature (see e.g., Kim & Marschke, 2005, page 299,
for references) firms and employees cannot easily contract around the problem of workers
leaving with innovations, an important reason being that broad non-compete contracts
will be voided by courts. We therefore assume that enforcement by courts is probabilistic,
in that the firm wins the litigation trial with probability φ ∈ [0, 1].10
A low (high) φ corresponds to a situation where the court enforcement is weak (strong).
We think of φ as partly being determined by industry characteristics such as diﬃculty in
assessing the nature of early-stage innovations, and partly by legislation. Stone (2002)
discusses various aspects of the law of post-employment restraints and argues that the
courts’ enforcement of such restraints varies from state to state and even from case to
case. For example, courts diﬀer in their interpretation of whether negative knowledge
qualifies as a trade secret (Stone, 2002, p. 756) or more generally in their emphasis of
protection of firms’ R&D investments versus the protection of free worker mobility and
the right to start up a new company.
We make two convenience assumptions. First we assume that the firm chooses a
(deterministic) litigation policy at date 0. One way to justify commitment is that it is
observable to outsiders whether the worker leaves or not, so that the firm can have a
reputation for being tough or lenient with leavers, or even write a formal contract upon
9We assume that the litigation cost of the worker is zero. Altering this assumption has no qualitative
impact on the results.
10The idea that court outcomes are probabilistic has substantial empirical support, see e.g., Lemley &
Shapiro (2005).
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it.11 Throughout, we assume that G(.) is such that the profit function is globally concave
in B.
An overview of the timing appears in Figure 1.
A worker is hired 
and chooses a 
non-observable 
effort level. 
The worker 
generates an 
idea and 
learns its 
value. 
If the firm 
litigates, the 
court makes a 
decision.  
Date 0 Date 1 Date 2 Date 4 
The firm chooses 
a litigation 
policy. 
The firm 
makes a wage 
offer and the 
worker accepts 
or rejects. 
 
Date 3 
Figure 1: Timing
The basic trade-oﬀs are as follows. The worker chooses an eﬀort level trading oﬀ its
private cost against a higher value of the idea if he becomes an entrepreneur. The firm
sets a wage that trades oﬀ the gains from keeping better worker types (ideas) with the
cost of paying more for all staying worker types. We focus on Perfect Bayesian equilibria
(PBE). A combination of strategies is a PBE if a)the principal sets a wage and its suing
policy optimally given its beliefs about eﬀort, b) the worker anticipates the firm’s behavior
and chooses eﬀort to maximize his utility. This equilibrium notion ensures that the firm’s
conjecture about eﬀort and the worker’s conjecture about the wage setting are fulfilled
on the equilibrium path.
Two assumptions underlying the model setup is that (i) the firm (uninformed party)
makes the wage oﬀer and (ii) that the firm sets a sequentially rational wage rather than
commit to a wage policy up front. Changing these assumptions is unlikely to alter the
main insights, as discussed in Section 3.5.
11Another way to justify commitment not to sue is to interpret commitment as granting formal own-
ership rights up-front to the agent over the innovation.
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3 Analysis
We solve the game by in backwards sequence examining the worker’s leaving decision,
the firm’s wage oﬀer, the worker’s eﬀort decision, and the firm’s suing policy. Then we
analyze the eﬀects of changing the level of complementary assets (θ) and strength of
property rights protection (φ).
3.1 Eﬀort and wages
First we examine eﬀort and wage setting in the subgame reached if the firm litigates.
Then we examine the same variables in the subgame reached if the firm does not litigate.
When deciding whether to leave or not, the worker compares what he gets from staying,
B, with the expected payoﬀ from leaving and starting up his own company, denoted by
U . Since the payoﬀ from leaving increases in x (independently of whether the firm sues
or not) the worker leaves if x exceeds some (unique) threshold value. We denote this
threshold for z, i.e., z = {x : U = B}.
Case A. The firm litigates. The worker gets B if he stays in the firm, while the
expected payoﬀ from leaving equals (1− φ)x. Hence z = B/(1− φ). For given B and e,
the worker’s expected utility equals,
U =
z−eZ
−∞
Bg(²)d²+ (1− φ)
∞Z
z−e
(e+ ²)g(²)d²− c(e). (1)
The first integral is the worker’s expected utility when staying (x < z) and the latter inte-
gral is the worker’s utility if he leaves (x > z). Let us analyze the worker’s eﬀort decision.
Suppose that the worker believes that the firm will oﬀer B at date 3 (in equilibrium his
conjecture is fulfilled). The marginal utility from exerting eﬀort equals,
Ue = −Bg(z − e) + (1− φ)(e+ z − e)g(z − e) + (1− φ)
∞Z
z−e
g(²)d²− c0(e) (2)
= −[(1− φ)z −B]g(z − e) + (1− φ)[1−G(z − e)]− c0(e).
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Since B = z(1− φ), the first term cancels and the optimal eﬀort choice, e∗, is implicitly
defined by,12
(1− φ) (1−G (z − e∗))− c0(e∗) = 0. (3)
The first term represents the marginal gain from eﬀort while the second term reflects the
marginal cost. Since 1 − G(.) equals the probability that the agent starts up his own
company, we see that the agent’s motivation to exert eﬀort stems from the possibility of
becoming an entrepreneur. All other equal, the worker will be more strongly motivated
if property rights are weak, or if he expects a subsequent low wage oﬀer to be made by
the firm. The first best level of eﬀort obtains for c0(e) = 1. A high φ or a high expected
wage both contribute to make the worker’s eﬀort ineﬃciently low.
Let us now turn to the firm’s choice of B. For given (e,B) the firm’s profit equals
Π =
Z z−e
−∞
(θ(e+ ²)−B)g(²)d²+
Z ∞
z−e
(φθ(e+ ²)− v)g(²)d²− F . (4)
The first integral is the firm’s profit from worker types that stay, and the second integral
is the firm’s profits from suing worker types that leave. Suppose that the firm believes
that the worker chooses eﬀort level equal to e (in equilibrium this conjecture is fulfilled).
Taking z as the firm’s choice variable, the marginal profit equals,
Πz = (θz −B)g(z − e)−
Z z−e
−∞
∂B
∂z
g(²)d²− (φθz − v)g(z − e) (5)
= (θz −B)g(z − e)− (1− φ)G(z − e)− (φθz − v)g(z − e)
= [z(θ − 1)(1− φ) + v]g(z − e)− (1− φ)G(z − e).
This equation reflects the firm’s trade-oﬀ when setting a wage oﬀer. An increased wage
means that the firm keeps more worker types (the first term), but must also pay more to all
types that stay (the second term). We see that a higher θ increases the gain from keeping
the marginal worker type. A higher φ decreases the gain from keeping the marginal worker
type (since the firm gets more from suing) and decreases the wage increase necessary to
keep the marginal worker type. The optimal z, denoted by z∗, is implicitly defined by
12Second order condition Uee = (1− φ) g(z)− c00(e∗) < 0.
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Πz = 0.
Case B. The firm does not litigate. If the firm does not litigate, the worker’s payoﬀ
from leaving equals x. Hence z = B. It follows from the same type of derivation as in
Case A that the optimal level of eﬀort solves,
1−G (z − e∗)− c0(e∗) = 0. (6)
Just as in Case A, the agent’s incentive to exert eﬀort stems from the possibility of later
becoming an entrepreneur. Since the worker keeps a higher fraction of value upon leaving
than in Case A, the worker’s incentives to exert eﬀort are stronger (for given z) in Case
B than in Case A. The profit given not suing equals
Π =
Z z−e
−∞
(θ(e+ ²)−B)g(²)d²− F . (7)
The firm’s marginal profits become,
Πz = (θz −B)g(z − e)−
Z z−e
−∞
∂B
∂z
g(²)d² (8)
= (θz −B)g(z − e)−G(z − e)
= z(θ − 1)g(z − e)−G(z − e).
As in Case A, an increased wage means that the firm keeps more worker types (the first
term), but must also pay more to all types that stay (the second term). A higher θ
increases the gain from keeping the marginal worker type, and φ has no eﬀect on the
optimal wage policy. The optimal z, denoted by z∗, is implicitly defined through setting
Πz = 0.
3.2 Suing policy
Having characterized the optimal leaving and eﬀort decision by the worker, and the opti-
mal wage oﬀer by the firm, let us now examine the firm’s choice of suing policy. We first
clarify the trade-oﬀ involved when designing a suing policy. The following result follows
from a direct comparison of the suing and no-suing subgames.
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Lemma 1 Fix θ and φ. Eﬀort is lower if the firm sues than if the firm does not sue.
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 1 clarifies the firm’s trade-oﬀ the when deciding upon a suing policy. Suing
ensures that the firm gets a piece of the cake if the worker leaves, but also reduces the
size of the cake since eﬀort decreases. To understand this result, consider Figure 2 which
illustrates the worker’s best eﬀort response function, e∗(z; .) and the employer’s best
response function z∗(e; .).
S 
NS
( )⋅;* ze  
( )⋅;* ez  
z  
e  
Figure 2: Eﬀects from the firm deciding to sue leaving workers.
e∗(z; .) slopes downward because a higher expected wage oﬀer means that the worker
becomes less motivated. z∗(e; .) slopes upward because a higher e means that it will be
more attractive to keep the marginal worker type. The unique equilibrium given no suing
is given by the intersection of the two solid lines.
When the firm sues, the worker’s marginal gain from eﬀort (for a given conjecture
about z) is less than if the firm does not sue, since his share of the cake becomes smaller.
This reduction in the incentives to supply eﬀort is depicted by the vertical arrows in
Figure 2. The firm, on the other hand, will with suing have a higher marginal gain from
raising z than under no suing (for a given conjecture about e) since he now avoids the
suing costs. This increase in the incentives to pay the agent is depicted by the horizontal
arrows in Figure 2. Both eﬀects work in the direction of a lower eﬀort when moving from
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a no-suing to a suing regime, as depicted by the move from NS to S in Figure 2. The
economic implication is that the firm faces a clear trade-oﬀ when choosing a suing policy:
suing gives weaker incentives for the worker to leave but also weaker incentives to exert
eﬀort.
The net eﬀect on z from suing is ambiguous.13 From Figure 2 we see that if the worker’s
eﬀort only weakly responds to changes in the value of their outside option (e∗(z; .) is flat)
then the eﬀect on z∗(e; .) will dominate and, consequently, z decreases if the firm practices
a lenient suing policy towards leavers.
The firm’s suing decision. We now investigate how θ and φ aﬀect the suing decision.
Proposition 1 (i)A firm not protected by complementary assets (θ = 1) must sue its
leaving workers to get positive profits.(ii)A firm strongly protected by property rights (φ ≈
1)) may not sue its leaving workers.
Proof. See Appendix.
If a firm not protected by complementary assets does not sue, adverse selection implies
negative profits. For any continuation wage level, the firm will only keep worker types with
ideas less valuable than the oﬀered wage. In contrast, a firm that is strongly protected
through complementarities and intellectual property rights may increase its profit by
relinquish its intellectual property rights and not sue. The intuition is simple: a no-suing
policy improves the worker’s outside option and increases eﬀort. With complementarities,
the positive eﬀect on profits from increased eﬀort can be stronger than the negative eﬀect
on profits from not suing the leavers. Given this argument, our interpretation of HP’s
personnel policy is that it was well protected by property rights or by complementary
assets, so well that suing leaving workers would seriously impact worker initiative.
13The eﬀect on wage setting is ambiguous as well. By suing leaving workers, the firm finds it easier to
keep workers by increasing the wage level slightly (the marginal eﬀect on z from an increase in wage B is
increased). On the other hand, the firm can reduce its wage oﬀer because it captures value from leaving
ideas. Therefore, depending on parameter values of the underlying distribution functions and cost of
eﬀort function, suing and wages can be complementary or substitute instruments for the firm when it
tries to keep its workers.
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3.3 Complementary assets
Let us now evaluate how worker initiative and wages change if the firm holds more com-
plementary assets. The following result holds independently of the firm’s suing decision.
Proposition 2 If the firm holds more complementary assets, then
i) wages are higher
ii) eﬀort is lower, and
iii) turnover is lower.
Proof. See Appendix.
Figure 3 illustrates how an increase in the amount of complementary assets changes
the equilibrium outcome.
0>Δθ  
( )⋅;* ez  
( )⋅;* ze  
z  
e  
Figure 3: Eﬀects of stronger complementarities.
When θ increases, e∗(z; .) is unaﬀected (since the entrepreneurial option is unchanged),
whereas z∗(e; .) shifts to the right. This is because for any level of eﬀort it will be more
beneficial to keep the marginal worker type. Consequently, when θ increases the firm
raises its wage oﬀer to keep more worker types. When the wage is raised, the outside
option becomes less attractive and worker eﬀort decreases.
We may link θ to firm characteristics such as size.14 If we assume that large firms
have stronger economies of scope than small firms, Proposition 2 suggests that workers
14One can also relate θ to industry maturity. Initially, firms are small, wages are low and the start-up
activities are plentiful. As the industry matures, concentration increases and there are more complemen-
14
in small firms put in higher eﬀort and create more start-up activities than workers in
large firms.15 The reason is that larger firms have more complementary assets, and pay
higher wages to reduce turnover. Our arguments therefore square well with the empirical
regularities that larger firms have lower turnover (Oi, 1983, Evan & MacPherson, 1996)
and pay higher wages (Fox, 2004).16
One environment that may serve as a testbed of the theory is firms in the aftermath of
mergers and acquisitions. Mergers and acquisitions, particularly in the technology sector,
are often motivated by gaining economies of scope. Our predictions would be that after
such mergers, wages per worker should increase and turnover due to workers pursuing
start-up opportunities should drop. Conyon et al. (2004) finds that wages do tend to
increase following mergers.17
3.4 Property rights protection
In this section we study the eﬀects of changes in property rights protection, interpreted
as the probability of the firm winning in court.
Proposition 3 Stronger intellectual property rights (increased φ)
i) decrease eﬀort
ii) has ambiguous eﬀect on wages and turnover.
Proof. See Appendix.
The eﬀects from strengthened intellectual property rights are illustrated in Figure 4.
tary assets inside the firm, workers get better wage oﬀers inside the firm but are less motivated, and fewer
workers leave to start up their own businesses. This provides a simple argument for why entry rates are
lower in mature industries. We are not aware of direct evidence relating to this question but note that
Long & Link (1983) find that firms in more concentrated markets have lower turnover.
15Economies of scope is the purported motive behind many mergers and acquisitions. Such a motive
would generate a positive link between firm size and economies of scope. The extent to which mergers do
in fact create economies of scope (rather than say market power) is the topic of a large literature, whose
findings are not conclusive. For a recent contribution to this literature, see Gomes & Livdan (2004).
16Henderson & Cockburn (1996) find a positive relation between economies of scope and R&D success
measured by ”significant” patents for a sample of biotech companies. This suggest that the direct positive
eﬀect on productivity from an increased θ dominates a possible negative eﬀect on productivity from
reduced eﬀort in their context.
17Brown & Medoﬀ (1987) reports a similar finding. Interestingly, Conyon et al. (2004) finds that the
increased wage eﬀect is larger for mergers by firms that are in the same industry. Such mergers are
arguably where one would expect the complementarity gain to be larger.
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Figure 4: Eﬀects from strengthened intellectual property protection.
When φ increases, the worker gets weaker incentives to exert eﬀort because the en-
trepreneurial payoﬀ is smaller. Hence e∗(z, .) shifts downwards. An increased φ makes
it cheaper for the firm to keep the marginal worker, because the entrepreneurial option
has become less attractive, and z∗(e; .) shifts to the right.18 Both these two eﬀects pull
unambiguously in the direction of a lower worker eﬀort.
Legal scholars argue that the Massachusetts courts are more ”pro-firm” while the
Californian courts are ”pro-employee” (Hellmann, 2002). Proposition 3, part (i), then has
resonance in Saxenian (1994), which argues that firms along Route 128 in Massachusetts
have fared less well than their counterparts in Silicon Valley.19
On welfare, we argue based on Proposition 3 that the eﬃcient intellectual property
rights from society’s viewpoint should balance the beneficial ex-ante eﬀects from motivat-
ing workers against the negative ex-post eﬀects on the use of complementary assets.20 We
18There is also the counter-acting eﬀect of workers leaving becoming less costly when φ increases, since
more is retained in court. This eﬀect is dominated in optimum.
19Variation in strength of property rights protection can be related to other variables than geography,
such as industry (OECD, 1998, Cohen et al., 2000) or with time. For example, up to the 1980-ies, software
innovations were diﬃcult to patent in the U.S. unless embedded in hardware (like mainframe computers
or pizza ovens). Landmark court decisions in the mid 90-ies dramatically improved the scope of patenting
software (Cohen & Lemley, 2001). Such variation in property rights protection across industries or time
may be explored in light of part (i) of Proposition 3.
20It is worthwile to note that φ = 1 can never be socially optimal. The intuition is that the marginal
gain in eﬀort from decreasing φ is large while the marginal turnover cost is small. Our analysis suggests
that neither firms nor workers would prefer courts to always rule in favor of the firm and that the
welfare-maximizing level of φ is also intermediate.
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note that existing policy literature (see Schotchmer, 2004) typically argues that intellec-
tual property rights should be strong when ex-ante eﬀects (on firms’ R&D investments)
are important relative to ex-post eﬀects (on the use of innovations). In contrast, our
analysis suggests that intellectual property rights should be weak when the ex-ante eﬀects
(on worker initiative) are relatively important and strong when the ex-post eﬀects (on the
use of complementary assets) are important.
3.5 Extensions
Let us here discuss some extensions of the framework.
Out-of court settlement: Many intellectual property conflicts are settled before
they reach the court. In our context, where the value of the idea is not contractible, it
is most natural to think of such pretrial-negotiations as a situation where the firm oﬀers
the worker to pay a licensing fee as a compensation for using the idea. Suppose that the
firm oﬀers the worker to pay a fixed licensing fee L.21 If L is accepted by the worker, the
parties save litigation costs and the firm must refrain from suing the worker. If the oﬀer
is rejected, the worker and firm meet in court as discussed before. In choosing L, the firm
balances the gain from increased licensing fee from accepting worker types and the loss due
to lower acceptance rate and consequent litigation costs. Our analysis suggests that the
equilibrium outcome splits the value of ideas into three intervals. The first interval consists
of workers with the poorest ideas. These workers accept the continuation wage oﬀered
and stay inside the firm. The second interval consists of workers with better ideas. These
workers leave the firm and are litigated by the firm since they do not accept the suggested
licensing agreement (out-of-court settlement). The third interval consists of workers with
the best ideas. These workers accept the licensing contract. In an empirical paper, Lerner
(2004) studies all litigation cases for a sample of firms fromMiddlesex, Massachusetts (the
borough in which the hi-tech area Route 128 is located). Amongst others, Lerner finds
that larger firms are more involved with litigation cases involving intellectual property
rights than small firms. Our analysis of pretrial negotiations suggests that the cases
21A variable licensing fee depending on sales or profit of the new firm may be more diﬃcult to implement
due to problems of verifiability. The eﬀect of a varying licensing fee on worker initiative and turnover
can be done in much the same manner as with φ.
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collected by Lerner (2004) are intermediate in terms of value, and may therefore be the
”tip of the iceberg”.
The wage oﬀer: We have assumed that the firm does not receive information about
the value of the idea before giving a wage oﬀer. There are various ways to make the firm’s
decision more informed. The most straightforward approach is to let the firm receive a
signal about the value of the idea before deciding upon a wage oﬀer. In a previous version
of the paper, we showed that if a signal S is generated by the process s = x + δ, where
δ is normally distributed, then there exists an easily characterizable equilibrium where
the wage oﬀer is increasing in the signal. The signal creates additional incentives to exert
eﬀort because the (expected) wage oﬀer increases in the level of eﬀort.
Rather than having the uninformed firmmaking a wage oﬀer, we could let the informed
worker demand a continuation wage. This modeling approach opens up for signaling
equilibria where a higher demand from the worker is associated with an idea of better
quality (see Hvide, 2005, for a related analysis). We do not believe that such a modified
wage bargaining will have important eﬀects on the results we focus on.
Finally, by requiring the wage oﬀer to be sequentially rational, we have implicitly
assumed that the firm cannot commit to a wage policy before it hires the worker. The
main diﬀerence between the commitment and non-commitment cases is that in the former,
the principal takes into account the negative eﬀect on eﬀort from increasing the wage. The
optimal wage will be lower in the commitment case, and as a consequence turnover will
be higher. Apart from this, our analysis of the commitment case has yielded qualitatively
the same results as in the present analysis.
Investments in complementary assets: The analysis takes the level of comple-
mentary assets as being determined by industry characteristics or size of the firm. We can
also think of complementarities as being endogenously determined by firm investments.
More complementarities give a negative eﬀect on turnover, by Proposition 2. This accords
with evidence from Møen (2005) that turnover rates are lower for more R&D intensive
firms. More complementarities also give a negative eﬀect on eﬀort, by Proposition 2, since
more complementarities make the worker anticipate a higher wage oﬀer and therefore
slacks oﬀ. When making an investment decision, the firm therefore trades-oﬀ the positive
eﬀect on asset deployment with decreased worker initiative. The profit-maximizing level
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of investments therefore depends upon the elasticity of eﬀort with respect to increased
investments: a firm’s profit-maximizing level of R&D investment decreases as a worker’s
eﬀort becomes more elastically supplied.
4 Conclusion
We have developed a theoretical framework to study how complementarities and intellec-
tual property rights aﬀect the management of knowledge workers. We report three sets of
findings. First, firms strongly protected by property rights may not sue leaving workers
in order to motivate eﬀort, while firms weakly protected by complementary assets must
sue in order to obtain positive profits. Second, firms with more complementary assets
pay higher wages and have lower turnover, but such higher pay has a detrimental eﬀect
on worker initiative. Third, we suggest that the socially optimal intellectual property
rights protection strikes the balance between the eﬃcient use of complementary assets
and worker initiative.
We see three areas of application for our work. First, our findings on optimal suing
policy might be useful to firms deliberating which attitude to take vis-a-vis leaving work-
ers. Our analysis suggests a clear trade-oﬀ: more suing gives the firm a larger piece of the
cake if a worker leaves, but also gives less worker initiative and hence a smaller cake. Sec-
ond, our results that stronger complementarities imply higher wages, less turnover, and
less worker initiative gives a set of hypotheses to test for in personnel data on R&D inten-
sive firms. These predictions are not obvious; for example the eﬃciency wage theory of
Shapiro & Stiglitz (1986) predicts that higher wages should lead to workers exerting more
eﬀort (because of increased cost to the worker of being fired). Third, our results on the
eﬀects of property rights legislation may be of interest to policy makers that aim to better
understand the eﬀects of changes in intellectual property rights legislation. One case that
comes to mind is the current discussion in Europe on the appropriate patent protection
for software innovations: we suggest that strengthened protection may reduce turnover
costs but may also decrease the productivity of knowledge-work due to less motivated
workers.
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6 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1 (eﬀort and the suing decision): Let us first examine the no suing
case (Case B). Equilibrium is then given by (z, e) which simultaneously solves (6) and
(8). Consider the ”best-response” functions e∗(z; .) and z∗(e; .) that are implicitly defined
by (6) and (8). Shorten the notation by writing just g and G instead of g(z − e) and
G(z − e). By the implicit function theorem we have that ∂e
∗
∂z
= −Uez
Uee
and
∂z∗
∂e
= −ΠzeΠzz
.
Since Uee < 0 by the agent’s second order condition and, as can easily be shown, Uez =
− g
Uee
> 0, we must have
∂e∗
∂z
< 0. Since Πzz < 0 by the firm’s second order condition
and Πze = −Πzz +(θ− 1)g, we must have that Πze > 0 and therefore
∂z∗
∂e
> 0. Note that
since
∂e∗
∂z
< 0 and
∂z∗
∂e
> 0 then for any for any (φ, θ).there is a unique equilibrium in
(z, e).
To evaluate the eﬀect on equilibrium values of (z, e) from the firm changing its suing
policy, we evaluate the eﬀects on e∗(z; .) and z∗(e; .) in turn. From equation (6), the
agent’s marginal gain from exerting eﬀort under the no suing regime equals 1−G (z − e).
From equation (3), the agent’s marginal gain from exerting eﬀort under the suing regime
equals (1−φ) (1−G (z − e)). Since (1−φ) < 1, the agent’s marginal incentives (for given
z) is stronger under no suing, and e∗ is higher under no suing than under suing. Hence
when the firm changes its suing policy from no suing to suing, the e∗(z; .) function shifts
to the south in the (z, e) space in Figure 2.
Now consider the eﬀect on z∗(e; .) from changing the firm’s suing policy. Denote Πz
under no suing, given by equation (8), by Πnz , and denote Πz under suing, given by
equation (5), by Πsz. Combining (5) and (8) then gives,
Πsz = (1− φ)Πnz + vg. (9)
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Now denote the optimal z under no suing for z∗n and the optimal z under suing for z
∗
s . By
definition, Πnz (z∗n) = 0. Since (1− φ) < 1 and vg > 0 it follows from the global concavity
of Πnz that z∗s > z∗n. Hence when the firm changes its suing policy from no suing to suing,
z∗(e; .) shifts to the east in Figure 2.
To summarize, we have shown that moving from the no suing to the suing regime has
two eﬀects. First, e∗(z; .) shifts to the south in Figure 2, while z∗(e; .) shifts to the east.
The equilibrium level of eﬀort must decrease when the firm moves from a no suing to a
suing regime.
Proof of Proposition 1: (i)We show that if the firm does not sue and θ = 1, the
firm’s profits are negative. First note that if the firm does not sue, then z = B. For
θ = 1, the profits therefore equal
R B−e
−∞ (x−B)g(²)d², where x = e+ ². This expression is
negative because x < B for any ² ∈ (−∞, B−e]. By continuity, the firm’s profits are also
negative for θ close to 1. (ii) Suppose that φ = 1. If the firm sues, the worker gets nothing
if he leaves. Therefore, all worker types stay for any B ≥ 0. We can therefore set z =∞,
and the firm’s profits equal
R∞
−∞(x−B)g(²)d². Since the worker’s eﬀort equals zero from
equation (3),
R∞
−∞ xg(²)d² =
R∞
−∞ ²g(²)d². The latter expression is zero since ² is white
noise. But since B ≥ 0, the firms profits
R∞
−∞(x − B)g(²)d² must be non-positive. We
now construct an example where not suing leads to positive profits. Let g(²) be uniformly
distributed on [−1
2
, 1
2
] and let c(e) = γ
2
e2. If the firm does not sue, z = B the profits are
Π =
R B−e
−1
2
(θ (e+ ²)−B)g(²)d². For a given B, the worker chooses eﬀort to maximize
U =
Z z−e
−1
2
Bg(²)d²+
Z 1
2
z−e
(²+ e) g(²)d²− c(e) (10)
=
Z B−e
−1
2
Bg(²)d²+
Z 1
2
B−e
(²+ e) g(²)d²− γ
2
e2
= B (B − e)− 1
8
(2B − 2e− 1) (2B + 2e+ 1)− γ
2
e2.
Diﬀerentiating with respect to e and solving, we have the unique interior solution e∗ (z) =
(1
2
− z)/γ, with second order condition γ > 1. Substituting into the profit function, we
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get
Π =
Z B−e
− 1
2
(θ (e+ ²)−B)g(²)d² (11)
=
Z z−( 1
2
−z)/γ
− 1
2
(θ((
1
2
− z)/γ + ²)− z)g(²)d²
=
∙
²θ(
1
2
− z)/γ + 1
2
θ²2 − z²
¸z−( 1
2
−z)/γ
−1
2
=
1
8γ2
(θ − 2zθ − 4zγ − θγ + 2zθγ) (2z + γ + 2zγ − 1) .
Diﬀerentiating with respect to z and solving, we obtain the first order condition
1
2γ2
¡
θ + γ − 2zθ − 4zγ − θγ − γ2 − 4zγ2 + 2zθγ2
¢
= 0, (12)
which implies the unique interior solution z∗ =
(θ + γ) (γ − 1)
2 (θγ − 2γ − θ) (γ + 1) , with second order
condition 1γ2 (θγ − 2γ − θ) (γ + 1) < 0. Substituting in for z∗ into the profit function,
Π = 1
8γ2
(θ − 2z∗θ − 4z∗γ − θγ + 2z∗θγ) (2z∗ + γ + 2z∗γ − 1) (13)
= − (γ − 1)
2 (θ − 1)2
8 (θγ − 2γ − θ) (γ + 1) .
Since the denominator is negative by the second order condition, the firm’s profits are
always positive.
Proof of Proposition 2 and Proposition 3: We are interested in the eﬀect of a
change in θ or φ on the equilibrium e, z, T in the case where the firm sues (Case A) and
in the case where the firm does not sue (Case B). We label the turnover rate as T , where
T = 1−G(z− e). Let us consider Case A, when the firm sues. On reduced form, we can
suppress B and write the two first order conditions (3) and (5) as,
Πz(z, e,φ, θ) = 0 (14)
Ue(e, z,φ) = 0.
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Denote partials by subscript and totally diﬀerentiate (14),
Πzzdz +Πzede+Πzφdφ+Πzθdθ = 0 (15)
Ueede+ Uezdz + Ueφdφ = 0.
We want to examine the eﬀect of changing θ and φ, respectively. Solving the system
yields.
dz
dφ
=
ΠzφUee −ΠzeUeφ
ΠzeUez −ΠzzUee
,
de
dφ
=
ΠzzUeφ − UezΠzφ
ΠzeUez −ΠzzUee
(16)
dz
dθ
=
ΠzθUee
ΠzeUez −ΠzzUee
,
de
dθ
=
−UezΠzθ
ΠzeUez −ΠzzUee
.
Let us now evaluate the partials. Diﬀerentiating Ue from equation (3),
Ueφ = −(1−G(z − e)) < 0 (17)
Uee = (1− φ)g(z − e)− c00(e) < 0
Uez = −(1− φ)g(z − e) < 0.
Note that Uee = −Uez − c00. Now the firm. Diﬀerentiating Πz from equation (5),
Πzφ = −z(θ − 1)g +G(z − e) > 0 (18)
Πzz = (θ − 1)(1− φ)g(z − e) + (v + z(θ − 1)(1− φ))g0(z − e)− (1− φ)g(z − e) < 0
Πze = −Πzz + (θ − 1)(1− φ)g(z − e) > 0
Πzθ = (1− φ)zg(z − e) < 0.
Now return to (16). The denominator equals ΠzeUez−ΠzzUee. This expression is negative
given the signs of the partials in (17) and (18). Both terms in the numerator of
de
dφ
are
positive and hence
de
dφ
< 0. Both terms in the numerator of
de
dθ
are negative and hence
de
dθ
> 0. Neither
dz
dφ
nor
dz
dθ
can be signed unambiguously since the terms in the numerator
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are of diﬀerent sign. Now consider turnover. Recall that T = (1−G(z − e)). Therefore
dT
di
= g(z − e)(de
di
− dz
di
), where i = θ,φ. (19)
Denote the denominator of (16) byD < 0. Substitute (16) into (19) using Uee = −Uez−c00,
dT
dθ
= (−UezΠzθ −ΠzθUee)/D
= −Πzθ(Uee + Uez)/D = c00Πzθ/D < 0
dT
dφ
= (ΠzzUeφ − UezΠzφ −ΠzφUee +ΠzeUeφ)/D
= [ΠzzUeφ − (−Uee − c00)Πzφ −ΠzφUee + (−Πzz + k)Ueφ]/D
= (kUeφ + c
00Πzφ)/D,
where k = (θ − 1)(1− φ)g(z − e). Hence we have established that dT
dθ
< 0.
Let us now consider case B, when the firm does not sue. In that case the partials are
Ueφ = 0 (20)
Uee = θg(z − e)− c00(e) < 0
Uez = −θg(z − e) < 0
Π =
Z z−e
−∞
(θ(e+ ²)−B)g(²)d²− F . (21)
The marginal profits are
Πz = zθg(z − e)−G(z − e), (22)
and the partials are,
Πzφ = 0 (23)
Πzz = θg(z − e) + zθg0(z − e)− g(z − e) < 0 Firm’s SOC
Πze = −Π0z + θg(z − e) > 0
Πzθ = zg(z − e) > 0,
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which gives,
dz
dφ
= 0,
de
dφ
= 0 (24)
dz
dθ
=
ΠzθUee
ΠzeUez −ΠzzUee
≷ 0, de
dθ
=
−UezΠzθ
ΠzeUez −ΠzzUee
< 0,
A changed φ has no eﬀect on turnover. The eﬀect on turnover of increased θ is negative
as when the firm sues.
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